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DOCTORING FRAUD & ABUSE:
ENFORCEMENT OF STARK AND THE ANTI-
KICKBACK LAW IN PHYSICIAN
RECRUITMENT MAY BE BAD
FOR YOUR HEALTH
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1998, Mina Nazaryan, associate administrator at Alvarado
Hospital Medical Center in San Diego, California, successfully
recruited an eye surgeon from a competing hospital. The recruitment
agreement guaranteed the eye surgeon a $435,000 yearly income.'
Nazaryan boasted that this enabled the hospital to handle an
additional 104 retinal cases. 2  Federal prosecutors were not
impressed. They allege that Nazaryan received kickbacks from some
of the physicians she recruited for Alvarado.
3
The federal government claims Alvarado Hospital and Tenet
Health Systems Hospitals, Inc. ("Tenet") paid more than ten million
dollars to recruit doctors to the San Diego area, and that much of the
money was used to bribe doctors to send patients to Alvarado.
4
Although offering incentives to recruit physicians is not a practice
unique to Tenet, the indictment does not define why Tenet's
arrangements differ from the common legal practices of other
hospitals.5 This indictment has sent a shock wave through the health
care industry and many attorneys are "recommending that
hospitals.., suspend using the [recruitment] agreement until [they]
see what happens with the [Tenet] case."
6
1. Feds: Administrator Made Desperate Moves Before Arrest in Alvarado
Case, REP. ON MEDICARE COMPLIANCE, Oct. 2, 2003, at 1.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1, 6.
5. Leigh Page, Hospitals Review Recruitment Strategy, MOD. PHYSICIAN,
Sept. 1, 2003, 2003 WL 2,248,365, at * 1.
6. Brad Cain, Investigation into Tenet's Physician Recruitment Practices
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Tenet's president criticized the indictment as "very broad" and
claimed it "mistakenly attacks a well-established, lawful and
common means by which U.S. hospitals attract needed physicians to
their communities."7 While this argument may seem insincere in
light of a host of other federal government investigations into Tenet's
practices,8 it cannot be ignored because "[financial] incentives are a
part of most, if not all, health care relationships and do not
necessarily increase health care costs or threaten patient welfare."
9
This Note will demonstrate, in fact, that prohibiting these incentives
may result in the very detriment to our health care system that fraud
and abuse laws are supposed to remedy. 10
The government fears that physician recruiting incentives either
explicitly or implicitly invite improper referrals to the hospital
providing the incentive. 1 As the Tenet case suggests, some hospitals
view physician recruitment as central to growing their businesses
since new physicians bring new patients to the hospital. This Note
analyzes the propriety of the hospital-physician relationship and
whether that relationship has been overly restricted.
Part II of this Note defines the current state of hospital-physician
relationships and discusses the growing shortage of physicians that
Expands to Seven L.A. Facilities: U.S. Attorney Subpoenas Documents on
Tenet's Relocation Agreements, CAL. HEALTHFAX, July 21, 2003, at 1, 1-2.
After four months of testimony, the case ended in a mistrial. The jury could
not reach a verdict on any count. Sarah Skidmore, Mistrial Declared for
Tenet, Hospital; Court Case Involved Kickback Allegations, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRiB., Feb. 18, 2005, at C1.
7. Debora Vrana & Ronald D. White, Tenet Hospital Indicted Over
Doctor Payments: Grand Jury Alleges the Facility and a Company Unit Bribed
Physicians to Refer Patients, L.A. TIMES, July 18, 2003, at C 1.
8. See Vince Galloro, Under Scrutiny: Tenet Legal Woes Multiply with
Kickback Probe, MOD. HEALTHCARE, July 21, 2003, 2003 WL 9,136,105, at
* 1 (detailing investigations into Tenet's Medicare outlier payments, allegations
that two physicians at another of its hospitals performed medically unnecessary
procedures and then falsely billed the government for them, and a trial in a
"whistleblower" lawsuit alleging violations related to its purchases of
physician practices in the mid-1990s). The confluence of these investigations
into Tenet's practices has overshadowed the legitimate goals of physician
recruitment arrangements in general. Id.
9. Robert Fabrikant, The Need for Repeal or Decriminalization of the
Health Care Antikickback Statute, HEALTH CARE FRAUD & ABUSE NEWSL.,
Oct. 2002, WL 3 No. 9 HTHCFAN 7, at * 1.
10. See infra Part V.
11. See infra Part IV.
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hospitals face today. Part III examines the tremendous arsenal of
laws used to combat fraud and abuse, chief among them Medicare
and Medicaid's Anti-Kickback law (the "Anti-Kickback law") 2 and
the Stark statute ("Stark"). 13 Part IV discusses the application of
these laws and demonstrates their relation to efforts by hospitals to
recruit physicians.
Part V argues that while the government's enforcement tactics
may be necessary to combat a real and critical problem, their future
cost to our health system will negate any benefit reaped from these
efforts. The current approach taxes already stressed and struggling
institutions that are in dire need of doctors. The financial success of
any hospital is vital to its ability to provide continued access to
health care for its community. Because of overzealous enforcement
of fraud and abuse laws, however, hospitals must jump through
multiple rings of fire to avoid an investigation. Yet many still get
burned. As an alternative, this Note advocates adoption of the
Internal Revenue Service model for assessing the tax-exempt status
of nonprofit hospitals.
II. THE NEED FOR PHYSICIAN RECRUITMENT
The government's attack on hospital-physician relationships has
exacerbated the decline in the number of physicians practicing and
entering the field of medicine. A December 2002 survey of more
than 1,200 physicians in San Diego County alone found that:
[o]ne in three physicians (35 percent) report[ed] they will
leave the practice of medicine within three to five years. Of
those who are staying, one-third plan to reduce patient care
hours. Sixty-four percent state[d] the region is undergoing
a physician shortage. In addition, 71 percent report[ed]
problems recruiting physicians to the county, which is the
nation's fifth largest in population.
14
Because San Diego is considered a bellwether city due to its early
adoption and high penetration of managed care, some experts say
that the city is on the "bleeding edge" of a medical crisis that is
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2000).
13. Id. § 1395nn.
14. Report Reveals Looming Physician Shortage, PR NEWSWlRE, Dec. 4,
2002, http://www.pmewswire.com.
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bound to spread across the country.'
5
A shortage of physicians makes recruitment incentives more
critical to the quality of care. The threat of a health care crisis which
some say is well underway should cause the government to
reconsider the aggressive tactics of its campaign against practices it
claims constitute fraud and abuse. The Tenet indictment is
emblematic of that enforcement campaign.
While this Note focuses on the growing shortage of physicians
in California and the critical problems facing its hospitals, ample
evidence suggests the crisis is nationwide. For example, in the past
ten years, U.S. hospitals lost 103,000 staffed beds and 7,800
medical/surgical beds, and 370 emergency departments closed
between 1994 and 1999.16 Chlifornia presents a practical study of
this problem since it has been the vanguard with respect to health
care trends in this country. '
7
According to a recent study conducted by Shattuck Hammond
Partners, high managed care penetration, competitive pricing, and
15. Id.
16. Stephanie Mencimer, Rich Man, Spore Man: If the Elite Want to
Survive Bioterrorism, They'll Have to Make Sure the Poor Do, Too,
WASH. MONTHLY, Dec. 1, 2001, at 30, 34, available at http://
www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0112.mencimer.html.
In the last five years, California has closed more than 23 hospitals and
50 emergency rooms .... Massachusetts lost 24 percent of its
hospital beds between 1988 and 1998. In a recent one-week period in
Boston, the city's 17 major hospitals were operating at an unheard of
96.2 percent occupancy rate, and emergency rooms have closed to
ambulances on a regular basis. In Cleveland, four of the region's
leading hospitals last year were in bankruptcy; the high-level trauma
center at Mt. Sinai was closed .... In the month of May, metro
Cleveland's 22 emergency rooms were simultaneously closed to
ambulances for almost 10 percent of the month due to the lack of
space.
Id.; see also Mary Chris Jaklevic, Trouble in the City: Mergers, Medicare and
Managed Care Combine to Force Closing of 38 Urban Hospitals, MOD.
HEALTHCARE, Jan. 8, 2001, 2001 WL 9,418,069, at *1 (describing the fiscal
pressures that have forced urban hospitals to shut their doors); Julie
Piotrowski, How Secure is the Safety Net? Public Hospitals Learn to Survive
in an Increasingly Tight Market by Closing, Building, Replacing and
Sometimes Converting, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Feb. 25, 2002, 2002 WL
9,524,662, at *1 (detailing the "precarious financial position" of public
hospitals and local efforts to preserve the safety net).
17. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
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low utilization threaten the viability of many California hospitals.'
8
More than half the state's hospitals are losing money from
operations, 19 and some may even face closure.20 The study identified
staffing as one "trigger point[]" that could contribute to the financial
weakening of California's hospitals.2' Meanwhile, "the state has a
legitimate interest in ensuring that hospital services are available in
communities where needed. 22
Across the United States, the communities most in need of these
services are located in rural and poor urban areas. 23  Reports of
physician and provider shortages in these areas date back to as early
as 1933. 24  The government has targeted areas lacking medical
resources by designating them as Health Professional Shortage Areas
25 26("HPSAs"). In 1997, 855 urban areas qualified as HPSAs.
Today, over 47 million people, one in every six Americans, live in a
designated shortage area.27 Not all communities suffering shortages
qualify as HPSAs, however. 28 0
The lack of practicing physicians leaves rural and poor inner-
city patients to rely on hospital emergency rooms and outpatient
clinics for care.29  Hospitals with emergency departments are
required by state and federal law to maintain physician call panels,
30
18. California Hospitals Face Financial Crisis that Threatens Viability of
Weaker Institutions, HEALTH CARE STRATEGIC MGMT., Nov. 1, 2001, at 6.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. COUNCIL ON GRADUATE MED. EDUC., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVs. TENTH REPORT: PHYSICIAN DISTRIBUTION AND HEALTH CARE
CHALLENGES IN RURAL & INNER-CITY AREAS 1 (1998) [hereinafter COGME
REP.].
24. Id.
25. See Health Professionals Educational Assistance Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-484, § 332, 90 Stat. 2270 (1976); see also id. § 752 (describing
obligated service in health manpower shortage areas under the National Health
Service Corps Scholarship Program).
26. COGME REP., supra note 23, at 29.
27. Id. at 6.
28. See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
29. See COGME REP., supra note 23, at 35-36.
30. See Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act ("EMTALA"), 42
U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000). The EMTALA
requires that an individual be evaluated and provided with medical
support services and/or transfer arrangements that are consistent with
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but most hospitals are suffering from insufficient call panel
participation. 3' Inadequate physician reimbursement for services
provided through call panel participation is a significant obstacle to
maintaining physician participation. 32 Physicians generally do not
receive adequate reimbursement for care provided to uninsured and
indigent patients.33 As a result, they are reluctant to join hospital
staffs that require panel participation.
34
Physician lifestyles and lack of financial incentives also inhibit
participation on call panels. 35 "With [the] rise of managed care, call
panel participation is not a good way to build [a] private practice." 36
Furthermore, "professional liability concerns and increased cost of
malpractice coverage steer physicians toward more lucrative
opportunities.,, 37  As well, "[m]any physicians believe that
malpractice lawsuits are more likely to arise" from patients seen in
the emergency department.
38
The government's recent attempt to alleviate these pressures
may be misguided. For example, the Bush Administration relaxed
the rules requiring hospitals to have specialists on call around the
clock. 39 As a result, patients will likely find it more difficult to
obtain some types of emergency care. 4 0 This remedy skirts the issue
the capability of the institution and the well-being of the patient. The
Social Security Act at § 1866(a)(1)(I)(iii) requires that hospitals have a
list of physicians who are on-call for duty after the initial examination
to provide treatment necessary to stabilize an individual with an
emergency medical condition.
Memorandum from Centers for Medicaid & Medicare Services, Department of
Health & Human Services, to the Associate Regional Administrators (June 13,
2002) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review). California law
requires the same. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1317, 1317.1,
1317.2, 1317.2a, 1317.6, 1371.4 (2002).
31. Healthcare Law Section, L.A. County Bar Assoc., Healthcare Prof.
Shortage: Cal. in Crisis; Physician On-Call Coverage Issues (2003) (on file
with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 3.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Robert Pear, Emergency Rooms Get Eased Rules on Patient Care, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 3, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/03/politics.
40. Id.
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of physician compensation that has plagued on-call panels and
implicated the fraud and abuse laws.
Private hospitals that remain in urban areas respond to these
problems by limiting service to Medicaid patients or closing their
emergency rooms altogether in order to discourage use of their
facilities by low income patients.4' The increasing closures and the
relocation of private hospitals from poor, urban communities to other
areas requires residents of those communities to rely on teaching
hospitals, which are "public" institutions that accept all Medicare and
Medicaid patients regardless of their ability to pay. Not only are
these hospitals overcrowded and understaffed,42 but because of the
large number of Medicare and Medicaid patients they serve,
providers in these areas are more likely to be targeted in the
government's vigil for fraud and abuse.
III. THE ARSENAL OF FRAUD AND ABUSE LAWS
To appreciate how fraud and abuse enforcement has complicated
the ability of hospitals to recruit physicians, one must have a basic
understanding of the laws, their origins and the way they have been
applied. The multiplicity and diversity of federal health care fraud
and abuse enforcement provisions is truly remarkable. 43
A range of criminal authorities address fraud and abuse,44
including the Anti-Kickback law.45 Criminal prosecutions may also
be brought under more general federal statutes that prohibit the
knowing presentation of false or fraudulent claims to the United
States, the making of false or fraudulent statements or
representations to the United States,4 7 and the use of the mail or
electronic communications to commit frauds. 48 Generic charges of
41. Marianne L. Engelman Lado, Breaking the Barriers ofAccess to Health
Care: A Discussion of the Role of Civil Rights Litigation and the Relationship
Between Burdens of Proof and the Experience of Denial, 60 BROOK. L. REV.
239, 248 (1994).
42. Id. at 247.
43. See Aaron M. Altschuler et al., Health Care Fraud, 35 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 841,842-44 (1998).
44. See Pamela H. Bucy, Crimes by Health Care Providers, 1996 U. ILL. L.
REv. 589, 591-647.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2000).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1994).
47. Id. § 1001 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
48. Id. §§ 1341, 1343 (1994).
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aiding and abetting, conspiracy, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO") violations, money laundering,
obstruction of justice, or tax evasion may supplement health care
criminal charges.
49
An equally potent range of civil authorities address health care
fraud. These include Stark, the federal civil False Claims Act
("FCA"), 50 and an array of administrative sanctions. The most
serious administrative penalty from the perspective of most providers
is exclusion from participation in federal and state health care
programs. 51 Four situations warrant mandatory exclusion from
federal and state programs for at least five years. 52 Most notably,
these include conviction of a felony criminal offense related to the
delivery of an item or service paid for by a federal or state health
care program.53  For many providers who are dependent on
Medicare, the five year mandatory exclusion can be the most
devastating consequence of a criminal fraud and abuse conviction,
which may otherwise result in little or no prison time.54 Finally, the
Medicare and Medicaid statutes specify numerous situations in
49. See TIMOTHY S. JOST & SHARON L. DAVIES, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID
FRAUD AND ABUSE §§ 2:2, 2:3, 2;5 (2003).
50. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1994). The civil FCA provides that one who
knowingly presents a false or fraudulent claim or makes a false statement to
the United States to get a false or fraudulent claim paid is liable for treble
damages, plus civil penalties of $5,000 to $10,000 per claim. Id. It also
authorizes qui tam, "whistleblower" enforcement, affording persons with
inside knowledge of fraud and abuse the opportunity to sue a provider in hopes
of recovering a bounty of between 15% and 30% of the total civil FCA
judgment or settlement, thereby encouraging private enforcement to
supplement and stimulate public prosecutions. See id.
51. See Julie Johnsson, Are You Guilty Until Proven Innocent? Tougher
Rules on Fraud Enforcement Put Providers on the Defensive, AM.
MED. NEWS, June 9, 1997, (noting that Medicare fraud cases are often settled
because providers cannot risk being excluded from Medicare participation),
http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/1 997/pick_97/pick0609.htm.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (2000).
53. Id. § 1320a-7(a); see JOST & DAVIES, supra note 49, § 5:3.
54. JOST & DAVIES, supra note 49, § 5:5 (delineating consequences of
exclusion from federal programs, including "professional license revocation in
many states, possible loss of hospital staff privileges, loss of access to
government financing programs, required disclosure under the securities laws,
and difficulties in accessing government programs supporting marketing
abroad").
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which civil money penalties can be administratively imposed.55
Although these authorities provide one more vehicle for pursuing
fraudulent or abusive conduct, most of them are rarely, if ever,
used.56
A. Anti-Kickback Law
The Office of Inspector General ("OIG"), established at the
Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") by Congress in
1976, conducts a nationwide program of audits, investigations, and
inspections aimed at identifying and eliminating fraud, abuse, and
waste in HHS programs. 57 The OIG actively investigates violations
of the Medicare and Medicaid Anti-Kickback statute to reduce fraud
in the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
5 8
Provisions of the Anti-Kickback statute penalize anyone who
knowingly and willfully solicits, receives, offers, or pays
remuneration in cash or in kind to induce a person:
(A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing or
arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for which
payment may be made in whole or in part under a Federal
health care [Medicare or Medicaid] program, or
(B) to purchase, lease, order, or arrange for or recommend
purchasing, leasing or ordering any good, facility, service,
or item for which payment may be made in whole or in part
under [the Medicare or Medicaid] program.
59
Violators are subject to criminal penalties 60 and/or exclusion from
participation in the Medicare and Medicaid programs.6 1 Because the
55. Id. §§ 2:5, 5:4.
56. Amendments to the Medicare and Medicaid administrative penalty
provisions, for example, provided penalties for upcoding, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-
7(a)(a)(1)(A) (2000), and for billing medically unnecessary care, id. § 1320a-
7(a)(a)(1)(E). Upcoding and billing for unnecessary services are also, of
course, already covered by the criminal statutes, see id. § 1320a-7(a), (b), and
civil statutes, see False Claims Acts, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1994).
57. Publication of OIG Special Fraud Alerts, 59 Fed. Reg. 65,372,
65,373 (Dec. 19, 1994), http://www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/alertsandbulletins/
121994.html [hereinafter OIG Special Fraud Alerts].
58. Id.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2)(A)-(B) (2000).
60. Id. § 1320a-7b(b)(2).
61. Id. § 1320a-7; see also JOST & DAVIES, supra note 49, § 5:3-5:4
(discussing mandatory and permissive exclusions).
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Anti-Kickback provisions are so broad that virtually every health
care arrangement or transaction falls within its reach, the OIG has
chosen to allow twenty-one payment practices that might otherwise
come under the auspices of the Anti-Kickback law.
62
B. The Stark Statute
The Stark statute provides a civil means for protecting patients
and federal Medicare dollars from fraud and abuse.63  The Act
prohibits any entity or individual from furnishing a service
reimbursable under Medicare to a patient if the patient's referring
physician or an immediate family member of the referring physician
has a financial relationship with the entity.
64
This self-referral ban covers both Medicare and Medicaid and
extends to nearly all types of health services: (1) clinical laboratory
services; (2) physical therapy services; (3) occupational therapy
services; (4) radiology services; (5) radiation therapy services and
supplies; (6) durable medical equipment and supplies; (7) parental
and enteral nutrients, equipment, and supplies; (8) prosthetics,
orthotics, and prosthetic devices and supplies; (9) home health
services; (10) outpatient prescription drugs; and (11) inpatient and
outpatient hospital services. 6 5 Like the Anti-Kickback law, Stark has
several exceptions to its self-referral prohibition.66 Indeed, while the
basic prohibition is narrowly defined, it still encompasses a wide
62. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2001) (codifying most updated version of safe
harbor regulations). Nevertheless, compliance with one of the safe harbors
does render a party immune from investigation, prosecution, or exclusion
under the Anti-Kickback provisions if the party entered the relationship with
the requisite illegal intent to induce referrals. See JOST & DAVIES, supra note
49, § 3:24.
63. In 1989, Representative Fortney H. Stark introduced the Ethics in
Patient Referrals Act to provide a civil means for protecting patients and
federal Medicare dollars. The Ethics in Patient Referrals Act was enacted into
law in 1992 and was codified as section 1877 to the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1395nn (2000). The Act became known as "Stark I." See Jo-Ellyn
Sakowitz Klein, The Stark Laws: Conquering Physician Conflicts of Interest?,
87 GEO. L.J. 499, 499-500 (1998). By the time Stark took effect, Congress
had already expanded the scope of the law. The result became known as Stark
II. Maria A. Morrison, An Analysis of the Stark 1H Proposed Rule, 67 U. Mo.
KAN. CITY L. REV. 613, 614 (1999).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a) (2002).
65. Id. § 1395nn(h)(6)(A)-(K).
66. Id. § 1395nn.
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range of common and legitimate business relationships in health
care.
C. Differences Between the Anti-Kickback Law & Stark
To complicate matters, the Stark statute and the Anti-Kickback
provisions are not entirely consistent with one another.67 As a result,
arrangements that comply with one may still violate the other.
68
There are three major differences between the Anti-Kickback
provisions and the Stark statute. First, because the Anti-Kickback
law is a criminal law, improper intent is necessary to violate its
provisions. 69 The same is not true of the Stark law, which is a civil
statute.70  Second, arrangements must fall entirely within an
exception to the Stark statute to be legal, but arrangements that fall
outside the scope of the Anti-Kickback law's safe harbor protections
are not necessarily unlawful.71  Finally, due to variations in the
requirements of the prohibition and its exceptions, compliance with
one law's safe harbor provisions does not necessarily mean that the
arrangement or transaction is also protected under the other.
72
IV. THE PROBLEM WITH PHYSICIAN RECRUITMENT
Physician recruitment programs have become effective tools in
the highly competitive market for skilled doctors. In rural or poor
urban areas, they are critical for luring any doctor at all.73 Some
physicians actively solicit such incentives.74 As a consequence, there
67. See Linda A. Baumann, Navigating the New Safe Harbors to the Anti-
Kickback Statute, HEALTH LAW., Feb. 2000, at 1, 3 (comparing Stark statute
and Anti-Kickback regulations).
68. See id.; 64 Fed. Reg. 63,518, 63,519 (Nov. 19, 1999) (to be codified at
42 C.F.R. pt. 1001).
69. Baumann, supra note 67, at 4 (explaining different intent requirements).
70. Id.
71. Id. (comparing scope of Stark exceptions to scope of anti-kickback safe
harbors); 64 Fed. Reg. at 63,519.
72. Bauman, supra note 67, at 4. Likewise, a valid relationship under Stark
still may violate the Anti-Kickback law.
73. Cf OIG Special Fraud Alerts, supra note 57, at 65,375 (discussing that
"hospitals have become more aggressive in their attempts to recruit and retain
physicians").
74. Id. The OIG identifies several incentives that may result in the
reduction of physician's professional expenses or the increase of his or her
revenues, including discounted office rental, income guarantees, low-interest
or interest-free loans, and travel expenses. Id. at 65,375-65,376.
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may be an explicit or implicit expectation that the physician refer
some or all of her patients to the hospital providing the incentives.
75
The OIG has increasingly considered these arrangements
suspect under the Anti-Kickback law "because they can constitute
remuneration offered to induce, or in return for, the referral of
business paid for by Medicare or Medicaid., 76 As effective as they
may be in attracting doctors, these incentive programs may inflate
costs to the Medicare program and result in compromised care to
patients. 77 For instance, a doctor who has an interest in referring
patients to the hospital providing the incentives, particularly in the
form of salaries or medical office overhead, may inappropriately
overuse the services of that hospital.78 Such incentive programs may
give rise to a doctor's implicit obligation to refer a patient to that
hospital, instead of a hospital offering the best or the most
appropriate care for that patient.
79
Similarly, under Stark, a recruitment contract between a hospital
and a physician constitutes a suspect financial relationship since the
remuneration flowing from the hospital to the physician takes the
form of an incentive. 80  Once that financial relationship is
established, any referral by the physician to the hospital for certain
kinds of services triggers a violation of the statute. 81 The catch here
is that almost all inpatient and outpatient services fall under the
scope of Stark, and thereby prohibit any form of referral. As will be
shown below, while Stark has a broad exception for physician
recruitment, it is ambiguous, rendering compliance something of a
guessing game.
A. Complexity of Enforcement and Uncertainty of Compliance
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services expect health
care expenditures in the United States to climb to 2.8 trillion dollars
by the year 2011.82 Health care fraud accounts for up to ten percent
75. Id.
76. Id. at 65,375.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. While there is an express safe harbor for physician recruitment,
discussed below, it is very narrow and cannot be relied upon for most cases.
80. See infra Part IV.A.3.
81. See infra Part IV.A.3.
82. Jonathan Cone et al., Health Care Fraud, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 713,
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of those costs.83 In 2001, the government prosecutions of health care
fraud resulted in over 1.7 billion dollars in penalties. 84 Because of
the severity of the penalties and the government's penchant for
imposing them, most providers are as concerned about compliance as
the government is about enforcement. The statistics belie the
difficulties of both provider compliance and government
enforcement of the fraud protection laws.
1. Compliance with the Anti-Kickback Law:
A Narrow Exception
The OIG insists that its "experience over the past few years has
shown that practitioner recruitment is an area frequently subject to
abusive practices." 85  Nonetheless, the OIG recognizes that such
practices may be necessary in geographic areas that have difficulty
attracting physicians.
86
The safe harbor provision will protect payments that an entity
makes to a practitioner to induce her to relocate 87 to an HHS-defined
HPSA for the practitioner's specialty area if nine conditions are
met.88 Outside of this exception, practitioner recruitment practices
715 (2003).
83. Id. (citing Dayna Bowen Matthew, Tainted Prosecution of Tainted
Claims: The Law, Economics, and Ethics of Fighting Medical Fraud Under the
Civil False Claims Act, 76 IND. L.J. 525, 525 (2001)).
84. Id. (citing HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM,
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT
FOR FY 2001, at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/hipaa0l fe 19.htm).
85. 64 Fed. Reg. 63,518, 63,543 (Nov. 19, 1999).
86. While the proposed rules applied only to rural areas, the 1999
Regulations base the qualification for this safe harbor on the HPSA standards
and thus include some urban centers as well as rural areas. Some rural areas
are not HPSAs, however, and thus would not qualify under this safe harbor
even if they did qualify under the proposed rules. Baumann, supra note 67, at
13.
87. The safe harbor regulation for practitioner recruitment does not apply to
retention agreements. It protects only the recruitment of a genuinely relocating
practitioner or a new practitioner (a physician who has been practicing in his or
her current specialty for less than one year). See 64 Fed. Reg. at 63,542; JOST
& DAVIES, supra note 49, § 3:48.
88. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(n)(2), 8) (2001). The other conditions include:
(1) the arrangement is recorded in a written contract that specifies the benefits
that the entity is to provide, the terms under which they are provided, and the
obligations of each party; (2) the benefits paid by the entity to the practitioner
must not be provided for longer than three years and the contract cannot be
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are generally not protected.
2. Compliance with the Anti-Kickback Law: The Intent
Requirement
The Anti-Kickback law's safe harbor provision constitutes a
narrow exception. Failure to fit squarely into it does not necessarily
constitute a violation of the law. The government must first prove
that the defendant: (1) knowingly and willfully; (2) solicited or
received remuneration; (3) in return for, or to induce, referral of
program-related business. In other words, even if a hospital
provides financial incentives to recruit a doctor to its area, and that
doctor refers patients to the recruiting hospital, there is no violation
of the statute in the absence of evidence that the hospital intended to
induce those referrals.
Some argue that the intent requirement eliminates the concerns
over the complexity of the statutory construction by presenting a
"formidable hurdle for prosecutors." 90 Indeed, a prosecutor will
have to prove that the charged offender acted with some form of
scienter, but varying interpretations of this requirement have led to
conflicting decisions.
Anti-kickback cases have presented two mens rea issues. The
first issue concerns whether a physician or hospital must know that a
particular financial relationship is unlawful in order to constitute
prohibited "willful" conduct under the statute.91 The second issue
concerns the level of proof required to show that remuneration was
renegotiated during this term; (3) the practitioner cannot be required to
generate business for the entity as a condition for receiving benefits, but the
practitioner may be required to maintain staff privileges at the entity; (4) the
practitioner cannot be prevented from establishing staff privileges at or
referring business to any other entity; (5) the amount of the benefits that the
entity pays a practitioner may not be tied to the amount of business that the
practitioner generates for the entity if that business is to be reimbursed in
whole or in part by Medicare or a State health program; (6) the practitioner
must treat any patient receiving medical benefits or assistance under any
Federal health care program in a non-discriminatory manner; and (7) the
agreement between the entity and the practitioner may not benefit anyone other
than the practitioner with the power to generate business for the entity. Id.
89. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b).
90. Timothy S. Jost & Sharon L. Davies, The Empire Strikes Back: A
Critique of the Backlash Against Fraud and Abuse Enforcement, 51 ALA. L.
REv. 239, 302 (1999).
91. Id.
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given to induce referrals. 92  Circuit courts have struggled to
distinguish illegal intent from a lawful desire to recruit physicians for
a legitimate need when the entity is aware that the physician will
probably increase its revenues. Consequently, the courts are
inconsistent with respect to their treatment of these mens rea
issues.
93
The first issue facing courts is the lack of a statutory definition
for the terms "knowingly and willfully."94 A number of circuits have
construed the terms to require that "the Government... prove that
defendants knew their conduct was unlawful. 95  For example, in
Hanlester Network v. Shalala, the Ninth Circuit interpreted
"knowingly and willfully" to require that defendants know the law
prohibits offering or paying remuneration to induce referrals and,
nevertheless, engage in prohibited conduct with the specific intent to
disobey the law. 96 Other circuits have applied a lower standard of
intent, requiring the government to prove only that the defendant
knew her conduct was wrong, rather than to prove she violated "a
known legal duty."
97
92. See JOST & DAVIES, supra note 49, § 3:58.
93. See Timothy J. Aspinwall, The Anti-Kickback Statute Standard(s) of
Intent: The Case for a Rule of Reason Analysis, 9 ANNALS HEALTH L. 155,
165-66 (2000); see generally Douglas A. Blair, The "Knowingly and
Willfully'" Continuum of the Anti-Kickback Statute's Scienter Requirement: Its
Origins, Complexities, and Most Recent Judicial Developments, 8 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 1 (1999) (discussing the intent requirement).
94. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2000); see also Blair, supra note 93, at 6-
7 (searching for the true meaning of the terms "knowingly and willfully" in the
Anti-Kickback law).
95. Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1400 (9th Cir. 1995); see
also United States v. McClatchey, 217 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 2000) (requiring
specific intent to violate the law); United States v. Davis, 132 F.3d 1092, 1094
(5th Cir. 1998) (upholding jury instruction that defined "willfully" as acting
"with the specific intent to do something the law forbids; that is to say, with [a]
bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law"); United States v. Starks,
157 F.3d 833, 838 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding Anti-Kickback statute only
requires knowledge that one's conduct is unlawful, as opposed to knowledge
that one violated the statute).
96. Hanlester Network, 51 F.3d at 1400 (requiring defendant to engage in
prohibited conduct with knowledge that conduct is unlawful and with "specific
intent" to disobey law).
97. United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 440-41 (8th Cir. 1996); see also
United States v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., 874 F.2d 20 (1st
Cir. 1989) (requiring proof that primary purpose of payment was to induce
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Under Hanlester, ignorance of the law is a defense. This would
appear to protect providers who incorrectly believe they are
engaging in legitimate practices, and to ensure that government
enforcement only targets real fraud. This, however, would generally
require the defendant to "successfully persuade[] the finder of fact
that he was somehow unaware that Congress had passed a statute
that outlawed such an arrangement."
98
The second issue facing courts has been whether a defendant
should be convicted "when his offer or payment of remuneration was
motivated merely in part to induce referrals," or whether conviction
requires that "motivation to induce referrals [be] the defendant's
primary purpose."99 The OIG and the only three circuits to have
decided this issue have applied the "one purpose" test.100
For example, in United States v. Greber, 10 a doctor who owned
a diagnostic laboratory was convicted for violating the Anti-
Kickback law because he paid "interpretation fees" to other
physicians to induce them to refer patients to his laboratory
services. 102  The defense argued that these fees compensated
physicians both for providing initial consultation services and for
explaining the test results to the patients. 103  The district judge
instructed the jury that as long as one purpose of the interpretation
fee was to induce referrals, the legitimacy of other actual purposes
was immaterial. 
104
Greber appealed, insisting that the government must show that
the inducement was the only purpose. 10 5 The Third Circuit rejected
his argument. 106 The court analyzed the legislative intent of the
statute and held that "if one purpose of the payment was to induce
referrals); United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1985) (stating if at
least one purpose was to induce referrals, requirement is met).
98. JOST & DAVIES, supra note 49, § 3:60.
99. McClatchey, 217 F.3d at 834.
100. See Davis, 132 F.3d at 1094; United States v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105, 108
(9th Cir. 1989); Greber, 760 F.2d at 71-72; see also Aspinwall, supra note 93,
at 165 (explaining that the OIG and the Third Circuit favor the broadest
interpretation of the anti-kickback prohibitions "one purpose test").
101. 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1985).
102. Id. at 69-70.
103. Id. at70.
104. Id. at 71.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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future referrals, the [Act was] violated."' 7 In particular, the court
noted that the addition of the words "[any] remuneration" to the
statute suggested that Congress intended that "even if the transaction
was not considered to be a 'kickback' for which no service had been
rendered, payment nevertheless violated the Act."'
0 8
Consequently, Greber's "one purpose" test minimized the
impact that the intent requirement would have on the government's
burden of proof. The case of United States v. McClatchey
10 9
provides a recent illustration of how this test is now applied.
In McClatchey, Baptist Medical Center entered into a series of
agreements with doctors Robert and Ronald LaHue, the owners of a
medical practice that provided care to nursing home patients." 0 The
contract guaranteed the LaHues annual salaries of $75,000 each in
exchange for their services as co-directors of gerontology at
Baptist."' Subsequently, the LaHues transferred their patients from
the hospital they had previously used to Baptist. 1 2  Despite the
LaHues' failure to perform substantial services, the hospital renewed
their contract. "1
3
The court concluded that McClatchey, the hospital's chief
operating officer who renewed the contracts, "knowingly and
willfully" violated the Anti-Kickback law because he knew the
LaHues had not performed their duties under the prior contract,
because he knew hospital staff did not want the LaHues to perform
those tasks, and because he understood the critical value of the
LaHues' patient referrals." 4 From these facts, the court reasoned
that a jury "could infer that McClatchey's very reason for negotiating
a new contract with the LaHues... was to induce them to continue
their profitable referrals.""11
5
The court recognized that "'[e]very business relationship
between a hospital and a physician is based 'at least in part' on the
hospital's expectation that the physician will choose to refer
107. Id. at 69.
108. Id. at 72.
109. 217 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 2000).
110. Id. at 826-27.
111. Id. at 827.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 828.
114. Id. at 830, 835.
115. Id. at 830.
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patients.' 1 116  Nevertheless, it held that a hospital "may lawfully
enter into a business relationship with a doctor and even hope for or
expect referrals from that doctor, so long as the hospital is motivated
to enter into the relationship for legal reasons entirely distinct from
its collateral hope for referrals."
'1 17
How is a trier of fact to know when that "hope for referrals" is a
motivating factor and when it is "entirely distinct"?' 18 Granted, the
"one purpose" test eliminates an easy defense for wrongdoers who
attempt to mask prohibited kickbacks as "interpretive fees,"
'"19
"handling fees,"' 12  or "management fees."'12 1  However, the
MeClatchey decision underscores the fundamental unworkability of
compliance with the Anti-Kickback statute for "[t]here is no point in
debating how much purpose is too much when there is no objective
way of measuring a person's or organization's purpose, and when the
purportedly prohibited purpose necessarily accompanies every
transaction."' 122 It is this hairsplitting that decimates the hurdle of the
intent requirement and, in effect, shifts the burden from the
prosecution to the defendant provider.
23
3. Compliance with Stark: The Perils of Ambiguity
Complying with Stark's civil ban on self-referrals has been
equally difficult. The scope of the law has increased with the
addition of ten designated health services. The law's numerous
exceptions, the issuance of various subsequent proposed rules, the
comment periods that followed, and the changes in the final rules
that resulted from the comments have produced a law that makes
compliance a dubious task.
124
116. Id. at 834.
117. Id.
118. In a footnote, the Tenth Circuit ineffectually dismisses this conundrum
by asserting that the making of such distinctions is the role we assign to juries
while at the same time acknowledging that it is unlikely a jury will be able to
accomplish the task. Id. at 834 n.7.
119. See United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1985).
120. See United States v. Hancock, 604 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1979).
121. See United States v. Lipkis, 770 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1985).
122. Fabrikant, supra note 9, at *4.
123. This burden is exacerbated by the threat to the defendant's reputation
and finances in having to defend against the action.
124. Steven D. Wales, The Stark Law: Boon or Boondoggle? An Analysis of
the Prohibition on Physician Self-Referrals, 27 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 1, 21
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For a compensation relationship to fall under one of Stark's safe
harbor provisions, the parties must meet any number of loosely
defined requirements. Payment by an employer to a physician is
excepted, provided it is for "identifiable services," is consistent with
the "fair market value" of the services, does not take into account the
"volume or value" of referrals, is based on an agreement that would
be "commercially reasonable" even if no referrals were made to the
employer, and meets other requirements imposed by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services.12
5
In particular, payment to induce a physician to relocate to the
hospital's geographic area and to join its medical staff is acceptable,
provided the physician is not required to refer patients to the
hospital, 126 the amount of remuneration is not determined by the
volume or value of patient referrals, 127 and the arrangement meets all
other regulations designed "to protect against program or patient
abuse."' 128 There is no "fair market value" requirement under the
physician recruitment exception; however, once the physician
becomes a member of the hospital staff, that compensation
arrangement must be consistent with the "fair market value" of the
services rendered. 1
29
Unlike the Anti-Kickback law, there is no mens rea requirement
under Stark, "yet the penalties may feel criminal to those upon whom
they are being imposed."' 130 This raises a fundamental question of
fairness. Under a regulatory scheme, damages are augmented "to
account for harms that remain unpunished and to provide added
deterrence" because it is understood that "only one in three violators
of a law will be caught."' 13 1 Thus, the ease with which innocent
offenders might be subject to stiff penalties is troubling since lack of
intent is no defense.
Some attempts at enforcing Stark have been successful,
132
(2003).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e)(2) (2000).
126. Id. § 1395nn(e)(5)(A).
127. Id. § 1395nn(e)(5)(B).
128. Id. § 1395nn(e)(5)(C).
129. Id.
130. Klein, supra note 63, at 524.
131. Id.
132. See Gublo v. Novacare, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 347 (D. Mass. 1999) (qui
tam suit involving Stark law violations); United States ex rel. Thompson v.
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however, enforcing Stark has proved to be as challenging as
compliance. In several instances, Stark "enforcers" have
experienced difficulty in defining and identifying inappropriate
acts.' 33 The complicated exceptions to the rules can make spotting
infractions as cumbersome for the enforcers as it is for the providers
and physicians. The difference is that the latter must walk that
perilous line between compliance and illegality in their attempt to
provide health care in an ever tightening market.' 
34
4. The Impact of Uncertain Compliance Issues
Critics cite overzealous enforcement and confusion over
intricate and complicated compliance as chief among the flaws in
fraud and abuse legislation. 135 As case law demonstrates, even well-
meaning judges are unable to interpret and apply the Anti-Kickback
statute in a principled and foreseeable manner. 1
36
A lack of clear compliance guidelines chills the efforts of
hospitals and physicians to alleviate the looming health care crisis'
3 7
in their regions. Compliance is not optional, and in the case of Stark
neither ignorance, naivet6, nor lack of intent are defenses. 138 Failure
to comply can be catastrophic, even if all parties never intended to
break any law. Because of the uncertainty and risk of fighting these
claims, many defendants are forced to settle. 139
This chilling effect may have extreme consequences for the
future of health care in the United States. Compliance with fraud
and abuse laws has proved unworkable, particularly in the area of
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (S.D. Tex. 1998)
(healthcare provider and affiliates accused of Stark and anti-kickback
violations).
133. Anne W. Morrison, An Analysis of Anti-Kickback and Self-Referral
Law in Modern Health Care, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 351, 378 (2000) (commenting
that the ambiguity of the language of the Stark laws is an obstacle to
understanding whether a particular arrangement is in violation of the statute).
134. See Kellye M. Gordon, Note, Friend or Foe: The Role of
Multidisciplinary Practices in a Changing Legal Profession, 36 IND. L. REV.
1363, 1375 (2003).
135. See Fabrikant, supra note 9, at *5.
136. Id.
137. See supra Part II.
138. Michael Pretzer, Stark Reality: The Latest Self-Referral Regs., MED.
ECON., Sept. 3, 2001, 2001 WL 25,619,733, at *3.
139. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
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criminal enforcement. 14  As described above, it is impossible for
health care professionals and their legal advisers to be confident that
their business conduct does not violate a criminal statute. 14 1 As a
result, "a significant amount of procompetitive, legitimate business
conduct is needlessly discouraged."' 142 Furthermore, the benefits of
prohibited practices outweigh the costs of potential abuse that would
go unchecked, and, ironically, achieve the same goals of cost-
effectiveness and quality of care advocated by proponents of fraud
and abuse legislation. 1
43
V. THE PROBLEM WITH THE CURRENT SYSTEM AND WHAT
CAN BE DONE
At some point, the policy arguments from which fraud and
abuse laws arose will be eclipsed by the burden they impose on our
health care system. As discussed above, stemming overutilization,
controlling costs, and maintaining quality of care were the driving
concerns behind the government's initiation of Stark and the Anti-
Kickback law. 144  In its fervent attempt to punish and deter
inappropriate financial relationships, however, the government's
actions have produced many of the results its efforts were designed
to eliminate.
First, the conduct prohibited by fraud and abuse laws can just as
easily produce the positive results the government claimed were the
purpose behind the prohibition. For example, in a letter from the
Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) Bureaus of Competition,
Consumer Protection and Economics, the FTC argued that self-
referral arrangements can improve quality of care "because an
investment interest may lead to a stronger, more permanent working
relationship between the referring practitioner and the entity in which
[the practitioner] has a financial interest.' 45  Moreover, a
physician's interest in a facility is directly linked to the facility's
140. Fabrikant, supra note 9, at * 1.
141. Id.
142. Id. at *2.
143. See infra Part V.
144. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
145. Theodore N. McDowell, Jr., Physician Self-Referral Arrangements:
Legitimate Business or Unethical "Entrepreneurialism," 15 AM. J.L. & MED.
61, 71 (1989).
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reputation for quality. 146 Other physicians will not refer patients to a
facility if it becomes known for providing poor quality services. 1
47
Second, the law itself has paralyzed the industry to the extent
that it threatens to undermine the provision of quality care. The
amount of money the government collects from penalties and
settlements has its costs as well. Because of the uncertainty
regarding compliance, particularly the conflicting standards for anti-
kickback liability, health care payers and providers are forced to
expend substantial legal fees simply trying to follow the law, let
alone the costs of fighting or settling actual claims. 148 Moreover,
health care providers often abandon potentially beneficial
arrangements because of the ease with which anti-kickback liability
can be established. 149 Certainly, the administrative burden requires
physicians and hospitals alike to devote an increasing amount of
attention to compliance instead of care. Finally, patients who require
multiple services may be inconvenienced by limits requiring
physicians to refer patients to a single provider, which may result in
compromised care.'
50
As the law stands, the government has complete authority over
any fraud and abuse investigation. Consequently, the impact of the
government's efforts has been great. Nearly 3,000 providers were
excluded from Medicare in fiscal year 1999.151 550 of those
exclusions resulted from criminal convictions for program-related
crimes, 323 from patient abuse and neglect, and 1,416 were based on
license revocations.
1 52
146. See id.
147. Id.
148. See Aspinwall, supra note 93, at 157 (citing the "statutory ambiguities
surrounding the issue of intent" under the anti-kickback statute as a cause of
substantial and unnecessary legal fees); Klein, supra note 63, at 522-23
(describing the "chartsmanship" a pulmonologist would have to conduct to
protect herself from penalties under the Stark Laws).
149. See James F. Blumstein, Rationalizing the Fraud and Abuse Statute,
HEALTH AFF., Winter 1996 (suggesting that current fraud and abuse laws
discourage forms of integration that enhance both quality and efficiency),
http://contenthelthaffairs.org/content/vol l5/issue4 (last visited Oct. 2, 2004).
150. See Klein supra note 63, at 522.
151. HEALTH CARE FRAUD & ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT FOR
FY 1999, at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/hipaa99ar21.htm.
152. Id.
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While health care abuse is rampant and the cost is real, many
providers criticize the fraud enforcement community for turning its
mission into a crusade. 5 3 In light of the flexibility courts have given
the government to prove intent under the Anti-Kickback law' 5 4 and
the virtual strict liability of Stark,' 55 it is not surprising that few fraud
and abuse cases involving large-scale providers are ever tried;
virtually all are settled. '5 6 In addition to the potential treble penalties
and criminal prosecution one risks in litigation, there is also the cost
of personal defense, negative publicity, and exclusion from the
Medicare program-a virtual economic death sentence. 1
57
Whether a provider who innocently misconstrues a complex
regulation would ever be found guilty in a court of law is in some
ways a moot issue if the provider cannot risk putting the issue of its
culpability to a trier of fact. When a law creates the risk of
victimizing innocents more than punishing wrongdoers, its
enforcement mechanism must be reevaluated. Because of physician
shortages and the stringent limits on recruitment incentives,
innocents are no longer limited to those health care providers who
are struggling through the complex and ambiguous maze of anti-
kickback legislation. The list of victims has grown to include
residents of communities no longer served by those providers
directly targeted by the legislation.
153. Johnsson, supra note 51.
154. See supra Part IV.A.2.
155. See supra notes 1458-1580 and accompanying text.
156. There are no publicly available statistics on the proportion of fraud and
abuse cases that are settled or that go to judgment. For one indication of the
prevalence of settlements, see U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE FRAUD
REPORT: FY 1997 (describing a sampling of cases brought or settled
under criminal or civil false claims authorities), http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/
pubdoc/health97.htm. The Report describes 307 individual conviction cases
under the FCA plus the settlement of 102 more hospitals in the Diagnosis
Related Group (DRG) project, but it mentions only two FCA judgments. Id.
See also U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
HEALTH CARE FRAUD & ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM, ANNUAL REPORT FOR
FY 2002 (specifying more than 1.8 billion dollars in judgments, settlements,
and administrative impositions won or negotiated by the Federal government
in health care fraud cases, of which well over a billion was the result of
settlements), http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/hcfacreport2002.htm.
157. Johnsson supra note 51.
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A. Recent Attempts to Address the Problem
The chilling effect on physician recruitment might be palatable
if viable alternatives existed to alleviate the problem. California has
experimented with several different pilot programs to counter the
flow of physicians from shortage areas. These programs have had
little success, a result that can be traced to the threat of fraud and
abuse enforcement.
An example of an ineffective pilot program is the Mexico
Physician Pilot Program. This program proposed an accelerated
issuance of three-year licenses to up to thirty Mexican primary care
physicians working in non-profit community health centers.
158
However, the California Medical Association ("CMA") rejected the
proposal, arguing that "Californians need and deserve adequate
numbers of properly trained, culturally sensitive physicians .... 59
Instead, the CMA sponsored student loan repayment programs and
other incentives for doctors to join the California Physician Corps in
serving medically underserved communities.160
Physician recruitment and retention efforts such as the Mexico
Physician Pilot Program are evidence of the problem, not the
solution. The CMA advocates a role that has become too risky for
providers to undertake. Hospitals fear using incentives to lure
physicians to their call panels precisely because of their vulnerability
to allegations of fraud and abuse.' 6 1 Yet, it should be the
responsibility of hospitals, not the CMA, to determine their
incentives. The CMA is not equipped to offer the incentives
necessary to draw the requisite number of physicians and specialists
to any given area.
162
B. An Alternative Approach: IRS Tax-Exempt Model
Tax-exempt status is as critical to non-profit hospitals as
158. Live Symposium, Anmol S. Mahal, M.D., California Medical
Association, Health Care Professionals Shortage: California in Crisis (2003)
(describing the Mexico Physician Pilot Program under California Business &
Professions Code section 853).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See supra notes 31-35 & 123-31 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 31-35 & 123-31 and accompanying text (explaining
how hospitals attract physicians by offering incentives that CMA cannot).
DOCTORING FRAUD & ABUSE
Medicare and Medicaid participation is to health care providers.'
63
In policing tax-exempt health care organizations, the Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS"), like the GIG, must ensure that "public"
monies are not inappropriately funneled to private parties.
164
Nevertheless, the IRS and the OIG have made clear that what may
constitute a lawful exemption under the Internal Revenue Code may
still violate the Medicare and Medicaid Anti-Kickback statute.1
65
In light of the troubles of fraud and abuse enforcement discussed
above, the OIG could benefit from an acute examination of the IRS
model. The IRS uses a more efficient method to determine whether
a hospital violates the requirements for federal tax exemption when it
provides recruitment incentives to private practitioners to join its
medical staff or to provide medical services in its community.' 66 The
IRS model is as effective as the OIG's current approach in its
respective area of law, but the IRS model has fewer debilitating
effects on actual health care services.'
67
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code provides, in
part, for the exemption from federal income tax of corporations
organized and operated exclusively for charitable or educational
purposes, provided "no part of the [organization's] net earnings...
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual ..... ,1
68
Furthermore, a compensation arrangement used to induce a doctor to
locate a practice in a particular area must "bear a reasonable
relationship to promotion and protection of the health of the
community. ' 69 Moreover, any private benefit to the physician must
be incidental to the public purpose achieved. 1
70
When a 501(c)(3) hospital recruits a physician, the hospital must
show that it is paying reasonable compensation for the physician's
services. 171  When a 501(c)(3) hospital recruits a physician to
163. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS 886 (4th ed. 2001).
164. See id.
165. See Rev. Rul. 97-21, 1997-1 C.B. 121; 4 Op. Off. Inspector Gen. 2 n.1
(2001).
166. See Rev. Rul. 97-21, 1997-1 C.B. 121.
167. Id.
168. 26 U.S.C.A. § 501(c)(3) (West Supp. 2002).
169. Rev. Rul. 73-313, 1973-2 C.B. 176.
170. See Rev. Rul. 97-21, 1997-1 C.B. 123.
171. See id.
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provide services to the surrounding community, but not necessarily
for the hospital, it must comply with the following four
requirements: (i) the hospital may not engage in substantial activities
that do not further its exempt purposes; (ii) the hospital must not
engage in activities that result in inurement of the hospital's net
earnings to a private shareholder or individual; (iii) it may not
engage in substantial activities that cause the hospital to be operated
for the benefit of a private interest rather than the public interest so
that it has a substantial non-exempt purpose; and (iv) it may not
engage in substantial unlawful activities.'
7
In contrast to the test applied in anti-kickback cases, the factors
described above suggest that, instead of determining whether "one
purpose" of a financial arrangement between a hospital and
physician is to benefit that physician, the IRS simply asks whether
"the community benefit provided by the activity outweighs the
private benefit provided to [the physician]... . The IRS's
balancing test must take into account the hospital and the
community's real circumstances, regardless of any illegal intent.
Conversely, Anti-Kickback law enforcers must only consider these
facts if the financial arrangement fits squarely within the narrow
language of a safe harbor regulation.
For example, under the Anti-Kickback law, if a physician is
recruited to a designated health professional shortage area for that
physician's particular specialty, recruitment alone may be evidence
of an objective need for the practitioner's services. 174 However, an
area can only be designated as a HPSA for one or more of seven
health professional types: primary medical care, dental, mental
health, vision care, podiatric, pharmacy, and veterinary.' 75
Moreover, the definition of primary medical care is limited to
doctors of medicine or osteopathy who practice primarily in one of
four primary care specialties-general or family practice, general
172. Id. at 123-24 (noting a "substantial unlawful activity" includes a
violation of the Medicare and Medicaid Anti-Kickback statute).
173. See id. at 124 (finding that the determination of the Board of Directors
of the hospital that it needs additional diagnostic radiologists to provide
adequate coverage and to ensure high quality of medical care was a
"significant fact").
174. 4 Op. Off. Inspector Gen. 8 (2001).
175. See 42 C.F.R. pt. 5 (2001).
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internal medicine, pediatrics, and obstetrics and gynecology. 176
The arrangement proposed in the OIG's Advisory Opinion No.
01-4 exemplifies the dilemma hospitals face when they do not fit
squarely within the definitions of the statute.' 77 In the opinion, a
recruiting hospital's service area was not designated a HPSA for any
medical specialty.178 The service area was designated as a medically
underserved area ("MUA"), 179 however, and, based on a bona fide
objective-needs analysis, the hospital argued that a shortage of
otolaryngologists existed within its service area. 8 ° The hospital
wanted to recruit a recent medical school graduate to relocate to the
area by offering the physician a loan to cover the expenses of his
five-year residency training in otolaryngology. 181 The loan would be
forgiven on the condition that the physician maintain a full-time
practice for three years in the hospital's area upon completion of the
residency program. 1
82
The OIG noted that when arrangements like this implicate the
Anti-Kickback statute and do not qualify for the practitioner
recruitment safe harbor, the OIG evaluates them on a case-by-case
basis. 183 Like the IRS, the OIG looks to "documented evidence of an
objective need for the practioner's services."' 84  However, while
evidence of this kind may be sufficient for an IRS ruling, it is only
one of a number of factors the OIG considers.' 8 5 Additional factors
the OIG uses to assess the level of risk presented by a physician
recruitment arrangement include whether the practitioner has "an
existing stream of referrals within the recruiting entity's service
area," whether the benefit is "narrowly tailored so that it does not
exceed that which is reasonably necessary to recruit a practitioner,"
and whether "remuneration directly or indirectly benefits other
176. See id. app. A.
177. 4 Op. Off. Inspector Gen. 2 (2001).
178. Id.
179. The OIG does not protect MUAs because, unlike HPSAs, which target
practitioner shortages, MUAs only measure shortages of health care services
generally. See 64 Fed. Reg. 63,518, 63,542 (Nov. 19, 1999).
180. 4 Op. Off. Inspector Gen. 2 (2001).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 3.
183. Id. at 8.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 8-9.
Fall 2004]
512 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:485
referral sources."'
' 86
Such a case-by-case approach is both a safeguard and a bull
whip. The OIG recognizes that "even when an area is not designated
as a HPSA, the area may be deficient with respect to a particular
specialty."' 87 As demonstrated by Advisory Opinion No. 01-4, the
OIG's approach may protect the hospital from administrative
sanctions. 188 The opinion suggests, however, that the OIG could just
as easily wield the heavy hand of the law because, under the "one
purpose" test, "[w]hen a hospital provides remuneration to a
physician in exchange for relocating or establishing his or her
medical practice within the hospital's service area, an inference may
be drawn that one purpose of the remuneration is to generate
referrals for the hospital .... 189
This comparative analysis with the test for tax-exempt status
reveals the troubling uncertainty a provider faces even after the
delivery of an opinion from the OIG. While an OIG advisory
opinion may provide some guidance to a provider before entering
into an arrangement, the OIG does not give a binding determination
on the critical question of intent.190 By adopting the tax-exempt
model, the OIG would, in effect, abandon the "one purpose" test, and
perhaps, the intent requirement entirely. As demonstrated by the
IRS, the government can still be effective in combating fraud and
abuse without creating more victims along the way.
VI. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding these recommendations, one cannot ignore the
important deterrent function of fraud and abuse laws. The severity of
sanctions has served that purpose well.' 9' At the same time,
186. Id.
187. Id. at 8.
188. Id. at 9.
189. Id. at 7.
190. Most, if not all, advisory opinions on proposed arrangements under the
Anti-Kickback statute include this or similar language: "Any definitive
conclusion regarding the existence of an anti-kickback violation requires a
determination of the parties' intent, which determination is beyond the scope
of the advisory opinion process." 13 Op. Off. Inspector Gen. 6 (2002).
191. Johnsson, supra note 51 (noting that most entities cannot afford to
operate without formal compliance plans and "[t]he feds have promised lighter
fines and penalties for entities that diligently uncover errant employees or
inaccurately coded claims....").
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government enforcement must not ignore the devastating price our
society will pay for its "success."
The IRS model described in this Note is an attractive alternative
approach largely because of its similarities to the method currently
used in health care fraud and abuse enforcement. Both methods
encourage compliance by dangling a large carrot in front of starving
hospitals-tax exemption under the IRS laws and Medicare or
Medicaid reimbursement under the Anti-Kickback law. Both have
been very successful. While Stark and the Anti-Kickback law leave
little room for error, however, the IRS model comfortably
accommodates a common sense analysis.
By focusing its analysis on the benefit of a particular physician
recruitment plan, the IRS model never loses sight of the central
purpose of this legislation: to provide and promote a fair and
equitable health care system. The difference between the two
approaches is critical, but the similarities make the change from one
to the other feasible.
As fewer doctors choose to practice medicine, and as
competition for those remaining doctors increases, the crisis will
only escalate. The opportunity to commit fraud and abuse will
persist even under the strictest form of enforcement, but we must not
forget that virtually every transaction in health care is, at least in part,
designed to generate referrals. 192 As the saying goes, even with the
best intentions, "there is no mission without money."'
193
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192. United States v. McClatchey, 217 F.3d 823, 834 (10th Cir. 2000).
193. Keith Berndtson, Improving Health or Making Money?, PHYSICIAN
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